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We review the evolution of modern Chinese intellectual property right (IPR) laws and 
enforcement and explore economic and political forces involved in international conflicts 
over Chinese IPR protection.   Our analysis considers why the U.S. and China moved 
from conflict to cooperation over intellectual property rights.   Structural and institutional 
aspects of the political economy of IPRs within each country are considered, and data on 
Chinese-U.S. trade in intellectual property-intensive goods are examined.   We conclude 
that although enforcement of IPRs within China continues to be relatively weak, Chinese 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
  Relations between China and the United States have become increasingly 
complicated over the last decade, with a large number of political and economic issues in 
dispute.  Prominent among these issues have been the recurring disputes between the 
United States and China over Chinese protection of foreign intellectual property.  Since 
1991 four bilateral agreements between China and the United States have addressed 
Chinese protection of intellectual property rights (IPRS).  While the agreements were 
accompanied in the mid-1990s by U.S. complaints over violations and subsequent 
bilateral tensions, the end of the millennium saw increased Chinese efforts to enforce 
foreign and domestic IPRS and less tension over the issue between the two governments.  
  Our focus in this paper is on the economic and political foundations of the 
ongoing disputes between the two governments as well as the rapid convergence of 
Chinese IPR law and enforcement to OECD standards.  International politics have clearly 
played an important role in the disputes.  For example, the 1996 dispute over IPRs was, at 
least in part, a spillover from the wider sphere of U.S.-China relations, in particular the 
contention over Taiwan policies and the 1996 visit of Taiwan’s president to the United 
States.  Domestic politics have played a role in the disputes, with the mid-1990s 
leadership transition in China (from Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin) and the 1996 U.S. 
presidential election increasing the need for politicians in both countries to become less 
flexible in their public stances, thereby further extending IPR negotiations and deepening 
tensions.  Economic considerations have also played a fundamental role in these disputes.  
As a net exporter of intellectual property as well as IPR-intensive products, the United 
States has incentives to pressure China to upgrade IPR laws and enforcement, while 
China, a net importer of intellectual property and IPR-intensive goods, has incentives to 
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resist.
1  Relations between the two parties are tempered by the limited capacity of China’s 
legal system and society to change rapidly in response to both domestic and foreign 
pressures.  We argue that China’s desire to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
fundamentally changed the nature of the game due to the WTO’s strong minimum 
standards for IPR laws and the veto held by the United States and the European Union 
over Chinese ascension to WTO membership. 
II.  IPRS IN CHINA AND RECURRING DISPUTES WITH THE UNITED STATES 
Prior to its enactment of modern IPR laws in the 1980s, China had three decades 
of checkered experiences with intellectual property institutions borrowed from the USSR. 
The October 1949 founding of the PRC was followed in August 1950 by the 
promulgation of the central government’s Provisional Regulations on the Protection of 
Inventions Rights and Patent Rights.
2   Inventors were awarded a “certificate of 
invention,” entitling them to recognition and monetary rewards tied to cost savings from 
their inventions.  The state retained the right to exploit the invention.  Procedures for 
registering trademarks were also promulgated in 1950, although few marks were 
registered.  In 1963 new trademark regulations were issued requiring trademark 
registration, with the intent being to improve product quality.  Publishing regulations 
provided authors with rewards based on the nature of the work, quantity and quality of 
Chinese characters, and number of copies printed. 
  The Cultural Revolution (1965-1976) led to the complete breakdown of this 
system.  The professional activities of scientists, artists and writers were severely 
restricted, and regulations governing compensation of authors and inventors were 
                                                 
1 See Gruen and Prior (1996). 
2 The following two paragraphs are based on Alford (1995, ch. 4). 
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generally ignored or repealed.  Restoration began only in 1977 when the “Four 
Modernizations” program focused on strengthening China’s capabilities in technology 
and science.  After 1978, under Deng Xiaoping, China passed patent, copyright, and 
trademark laws that meet most international standards; established major organizations 
for training officials, registering rights, and adjudicating disputes; and made great strides 
in enforcing its new IPR laws.  The rapid progress was accompanied from the start by 
external pressure from the United States and the European Union.
3  China’s opening to 
foreign trade in the early 1970s trigged concerns by foreign firms selling products in 
China that Chinese law did not protect IPRs attached to these products.  The 1979 
Agreement on Trade Relations between the United States and China specified that China 
would adopt international IPR standards to protect intellectual property embodied in 
traded goods from the United States. 
  Since 1980, China has made extensive progress in joining international IPR 
conventions, passing domestic IPR laws, and establishing registration, enforcement, and 
training procedures.  We briefly review major accomplishments.
4 
•  International Conventions.  Beijing has joined virtually all major international IPR 
conventions, beginning with the World Intellectual Property Organization in 1980; 
the Paris Convention in 1984; the Madrid Protocol and the Washington Convention in 
1989; the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention in 1992; the 
Geneva Phonograms Convention in 1993; and the Patent Cooperation Treaty in 1994. 
Beijing also adheres to the Budapest Treaty on Deposit of Microorganisms; the Nice 
Agreement on Marks; the Strasbourg Agreement on international patent 
classification; the Locarno Agreement on industrial design classification; the Revised 
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants; and the 2000 
Patent Law Treaty. 
 
•  Domestic Laws.  Beijing got off to a fast start with passage of its trademark law in 
1982 and its patent law in 1984 but was slower to adopt other basic statutes.  Its 
                                                 
3 US and British pressure on China to establish IPRs has a long history, beginning after the Boxer Rebellion 
in 1900.  The Mackay Treaty of 1902 with Great Britain and China’s 1903 treaty with the United States 
both allowed for protection of foreign trademarks (Alford, 1995, ch. 3).   
4 See Yu (1994), Yeh (1996), and Pun (1996) for more extensive discussions. 
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copyright law was delayed until 1990 and regulations protecting computer software 
were not enacted until 1991.  Decisions of the National People’s Congress Standing 
Committee in 1993 and 1994 have strengthened penalties against counterfeiting and 
infringing on copyrights.  China enacted new copyright and trademark laws on 
October 27, 2001 to bring them into conformity with the TRIPS Agreement.  An 
amended Patent Law was approved by the People’s Congress in August 2000 and 
came into effect in July 2001.  China issued new regulations for protecting plant 
varieties and layout designs of integrated circuits, effective October 1, 1997.  Trade 
secrets are protected under Article 10 of the Chinese Unfair Competition Law.   
 
•  Special IPR Courts.  China has established special IPR courts in 5 provinces and 
cities: Hainan, Guangdong, Fujian, Beijing, and Shanghai (Kolton, 1996).  
Specialized courts were set up to ensure that judges well versed in complex IPR law 
hear these cases.  The new Chinese courts have awarded monetary damages to major 
American corporations, such as Prentice Hall, Harcourt Brace, and World Disney as 
remedies for copyright violations.  Foreign firms have, however, complained that 
Chinese courts have few mechanisms for enforcing their orders.
5  Foreign attention 
has also been focused on Article 62(3) of TRIPS, which requires that all final 
administrative decisions with respect to IPRs be subject to review, by a judicial or 
quasi-judicial authority.  Currently, most administrative decisions in China are final.  
China’s courts also do not allow the award of damages in IPR infringement cases in 
which the infringer was unaware that infringement was taking place.  This conflicts 
with Article 45(2) of TRIPS, which allows for damages even if the infringer was 
unaware that the infringing activity was against the law. 
 
•  IPR Databases.  Monetary aid and personnel training from the German government 
helped the Chinese government to establish electronic data bases for patents in 1995.   
 
•  Training Programs.  Several major universities, e.g., Beijing University, the 
People’s University, and Wuhan University, have established IPR training programs 
for judges, lawyers, government IPR officials, and businessmen. 
 
•  Software Title Verification Office.  Opened in Beijing in May 1997, this office is 
intended to act as a liaison between Chinese CD-ROM manufacturers and American 
software publishers.  The Office is supposed to verify the legitimacy of a software 
order at a Chinese factory by verifying a contract with the software’s original 
publisher. 
 
•  Internet IPRs.  China has been slow to pass legislation regulating internet copyright 
and trademark issues.  However, in 2000 the Beijing Supreme Court issued a “Guide 
Opinion on the Trial of Civil Cases Related to IP Rights Caused by the Registration 
& Use of Domain Names,” which acknowledges that registering and using well-
known trademarks as domain names constitutes unfair competition.  Also, in 
December 2000, China’s Supreme People’s Court issued interpretations of China’s 
                                                 
5 See Seth Faison, “Pirates Show their Colors: Chinese Firms Start to Defy Courts, International Herald 
Tribune, May 18, 1995, p. 17. 
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IPR laws with respect to their applicability to internet copyright disputes.  The 
October 2001 revision of China’s copyright law incorporated numerous new 
provisions governing on-line copyright protection. 
 
  Despite these accomplishments, there have been recurring disputes over IPRs 
between the United States and China.  The two governments initiated ongoing “IPR 
consultations” in 1986.  In May 1991, the U.S. Government opened a Special 301 
investigation of IPR protection in China.  Six rounds of bilateral negotiations led to a 
Memorandum of Understanding in January 1992.  China agreed to upgrade its patent, 
copyright, trademark, and trade secret laws and to join major international conventions. 
  Since 1994, U.S. complaints have generally focused on enforcement of IPRs 
rather than changes in their content.   In 1994, the USTR complained to the Chinese 
Government that Chinese firms were violating U.S. copyrights on a variety of goods, 
including computer software, CDs, LDs, and audiocassettes.  Chinese media laws 
restricted the lawful distribution of imported CDs and cassette tapes, yet a large majority 
of the 75 million CDs produced in China contained copyrighted songs used without 
permission of their owners.  Outdoor markets near major universities, such as in the 
Zhongguancun district near Beijing University, openly sold pirated software programs.  
The Computer Software Association reported that China purchased just $1 of software 
per desktop computer, the lowest rate in the world.
6 
  The Chinese government responded to U.S. complaints by shutting down several 
CD factories producing pirated discs; the United States government responded by 
threatening to impose trade sanctions beginning February 26, 1995 unless additional 
enforcement was undertaken.  Formal U.S. sanctions would take the form of retaliatory 
tariffs on Chinese exports, such as cellular telephones, sporting goods, and plastic items.  
                                                 
6 Reuters, Jan. 20, 1995. 
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More importantly, the United States would continue to veto China’s application to 
become a member of the World Trade Organization.  China quickly responded by 
announcing that it would retaliate by imposing tariffs on selected U.S. goods, such as 
alcohol, cigarettes, video games, and compact discs; suspending joint venture talks with 
U.S. automobile companies; and possibly purchasing more aircraft from Europe’s Airbus 
Industrie Consortium rather than the U.S.’s Boeing Company.  
The conflict was resolved when China agreed to a new bilateral copyright 
agreement just hours after the U.S. deadline expired.  The detailed 30-page text contained 
numerous important features. 
•  Export of infringing products prohibited; 
 
•  Factories producing infringing CDs to be closed; 
 
•  A title verification system to be established to prevent use or sale of audio visual 
works without the consent of the U.S. copyright owner; 
 
•  IPR working groups to be established at the central, provincial, and local levels to 
coordinate enforcement efforts and to draft and implement regulations and legislation;  
 
•  Focused enforcement efforts to be established for IPRs in audio visual works, 
computer programs, and publications; 
 
•  National treatment for civil filing fees and expeditious handling of IPR cases 
involving foreigners to be implemented; foreigners will have the right to initiate 
investigations of infringement of their rights, to petition relevant authorities for 
enforcement action, and to collect and submit evidence towards their complaints; 
 
•  No quotas to be established on U.S. audio visual products; 
 
•  Record companies to be allowed to market their entire catalog of works subject to 
censorship concerns; 
 
•  All IPR laws, regulations, interpretations, rules, and decrees to be compiled and 
published by September 1, 1995; 
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•  U.S. IPR-related companies to be allowed to enter into joint ventures for the 
production and reproduction of their works in China.  Initial ventures limited to 
Shanghai and Guangzhou and expanded to 11 other cities by 2000.
7 
 
  China implemented parts of this agreement by carrying out thousands of raids on 
retail outlets selling pirated products, upgrading enforcement efforts, and closing seven 
infringing CD factories.  Increased judicial protection of IPRs was highlighted by the 
Walt Disney Co.’s court judgment against several Chinese companies producing works 
showing unlicensed Disney characters.  Despite these positive measures, approximately 
30-45 licensed and unlicensed factories continued to produce infringing CDs; village 
“viewing rooms” showing pirated LDs thrived; and most computer software sold in retail 
stores was illegally copied.
8  The International Federation of the Phonographic Industry 
claimed that 36 million of the 40 million CDs produced in China during 1995 used 
copyrighted songs without permission.  Fines for violations were also considered 
inadequate in some prominent cases.  For example, a court imposed a fine of only $2,500 
for pirating 200,000 copies of Microsoft’s DOS operating system.
9 
  In early 1996 the United States government demanded that the Chinese 
government close the infringing CD factories, tighten customs controls on exports of 
pirated goods, and provide greater market access to copyrighted U.S. music, films, and 
software.  The United States targeted $3 billion in Chinese clothing and electronic 
products for tariffs, while China targeted American movies, TV programs, and CDs for 
tariffs and announced the suspension of joint venture talks with American pharmaceutical 
and chemical firms. 
                                                 
7 China subsequently signed a similar agreement with the EU.  The EU did not conduct formal 
investigations of Chinese enforcement of IPRs during the 1990s, but did communicate its intent not to 
allow China into the WTO until it protects intellectual property according to the TRIPS standards.  
8 In the early 1990s China started to pay royalties to international music publishers when songs were played 
on the radio, on a concert stage, in television commercials, or in a karaoke bar.  Payments to international 
music publishers totaled only US$400,000 in 1994.  
9 See Far Eastern Economic Review, May 19, 1994, p. 55. 
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  The dispute was settled on June 17, 1996 when China agreed to close the 
infringing CD factories and to increase its enforcement efforts against piracy.  China 
increased its enforcement efforts in the months prior to the June agreement and has 
continued stronger enforcement efforts through 2001.  Most of the infringing CD 
factories have been closed, and stamps used to produce infringing CDs destroyed.  
Several wholesale centers in Guangdong Province selling pirated CDs have been shut 
down.  Efforts have been made to close “LD viewing rooms.”  Increased enforcement 
efforts by Chinese customs agents have stopped the export of tens of thousands of 
infringing CDs, LDs, and Video Compact Discs (VCDs) to neighboring economies.  
Chinese customs officials have participated in several U.S.-organized IPR training 
sessions.   
The increased Chinese IPR enforcement has had some unintended consequences.  
Chinese crackdowns on piracy of VCDs pushed counterfeiters “offshore” to Macau and 
Hong Kong beginning in 1997.  Macau had no copyright law and the International 
Federation of Phonographic Industries estimated that each day 500,000 VCDs were 
smuggled from Macau into China. The boom in pirated VCDs has ignited a huge demand 
in China for VCD players, with 57 million produced between 1994 and 1999.
10  Chinese 
officials concede that they have been unable to control VCD piracy, despite having 
success in controlling piracy of some other goods.  While American trade officials are 
aware of these problems, they have been reluctant to pressure China more heavily in light 
of its increased IPR enforcement efforts.   
III.  THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF STRENGTHENING IPRS IN CHINA 
                                                 
10 See Seth Faison, “China Turns Blind Eye to Pirated Disks,” New York Times, March 28, 1998, D1, D2 
and Zhongguo Dianzi Bao (China Electronic News), March 15, 2000.  Sales of Chinese VCD players have 
created a powerful domestic interest group, VCD manufacturers, that clearly benefits from VCD piracy. 
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  In this section we briefly review the potential costs and benefits to China of 
strengthening their intellectual property regime.  Though necessarily speculative, this 
discussion is informed by a growing literature on the relationship between IPRs and 
economic development.
11  The interested reader is referred to more extensive literature 
surveys (Besen and Raskind 1991, Evenson and Westphal 1997, Maskus and Konan 
1994, Primo Braga 1996, and Maskus 2000). 
Innovation and creative works may benefit China by adding to the variety of 
products available, improving the quality and attributes of existing products, and 
enriching culture.  Innovative and creative works differ from most other goods in that 
they are nonrivalrous, i.e., the inventors may find it prohibitively costly to exclude an 
imitator from reproducing their creative works.  Unless property rights in intellectual 
innovations are established and their enforcement is facilitated by the rule of law, market 
participants will have little incentive to compensate creators once the innovation becomes 
public knowledge.  By limiting market access, IPR owners are able to charge a monopoly 
price above the production cost.  This price should be sufficiently high to compensate the 
inventor for production and creative costs, provide a reasonable rate of profit, and offset 
the risk burden associated with the creative process.  Yet by allowing IPR owners to set 
monopoly prices for the duration of the intellectual property right, ex post efficiency 
losses result as the IPR restricts availability and increases cost of using existing creative 
products.  Thus a tradeoff exists.  Too weak IPR protection discourages creative activity 
                                                 
11 Gould and Gruben (1996) found no relationship between stronger patent laws and economic growth but 
that a strong relationship between patent strength interacted with a measure of trade liberalization and 
economic growth.  Park and Ginarte (1997) found no relationship between stronger patent laws and 
economic growth but that strong IPR protection increases physical investment and R&D spending, two 
basic determinants of economic growth. 
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and dampens variety of products available while too strong protection provides excessive 
market power. 
  As China becomes more integrated in the world economy, intellectual innovations 
spill over its borders more readily.  A large number of studies have isolated numerous 
determinates of the gains or losses from a country’s adoption of stronger IPRs in a global 
context.
12   They include the country's potential to attract foreign investment; whether the 
country's firms are capable of developing patentable products and processes; the ability of 
the country’s R&D sector to respond to the new incentives; and the popularity of domestic 
music, films, art, computer programs, and other literary works.  Will China gain from 
adopting stronger IPRs and enforcing foreign and domestic intellectual property rights 
more closely?  The answer depends on the strength and interaction of several important 
effects.   
Rent Transfer Effect 
As a net importer of innovation and technology, China has traditionally 
maintained low IPR protection to encourage low-cost imitation.  Chinese firms regularly 
counterfeit foreign copyrighted movies, music, and computer software.  The technology 
for high-quality copying is readily available.  For example, CD replicators cost only $2.5 
million each in 1997 (down from $30 million in 1987) and are “small, portable, and easy 
to use.”
13  Manufacturers of CD replicators in the Netherlands, Germany, and Sweden 
regularly soldl replicators to Chinese firms in the mid-1990s without inquiring whether 
they were using them to produce CDs containing pirated music.  Unauthorized use of 
                                                 
12 See Taylor (1994), Helpman (1993), Maskus (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991, 1994), Diwan and 
Rodrik (1991), Deardorff (1992), Kawaura and La Croix (1995), La Croix and Kawaura (1996), Maskus and 
Konan (1994), and Chin and Grossman (1991).   
13 See Robert S. Greenberger and Craig R. Smith, “CD Piracy Flourishes in China, and West Supplies 
Equipment,” Wall Street Journal, April 24, 1997, pp. A1, A13. 
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prominent foreign trademarks on goods such as clothing, watches, and handbags is also 
widespread.  The temptation to infringe on IPRs is fueled by the large gap between the 
market price of the legitimate product and the cost of production of “close” imitations.  
The ability to imitate technology in labor-intensive industries enables many Chinese 
firms to compete effectively in global markets.  The percentage of GDP as trade (imports 
plus exports) has increased from 9.8% in 1978 to 34.42% in 1999 (China Statistical 
Yearbook, 1999, pp. 55, 577-78). 
  The strengthening of IPR protection essentially raises China’s cost of technology 
acquisition as local producers are forced to either pay royalties to Western IPR owners or 
to exit the market.  This induces increases in product prices and a transfer of rents and 
royalties from Chinese consumers and producers to foreign IPR owners (Chin and 
Grossman 1988, Maskus 1990, Deardorff 1990, Helpman 1993). From China’s 
perspective, tighter IPRs imply deterioration in its terms of trade.  Thus, it is unsurprising 
to observe the Chinese government trying to “jawbone” foreign patent holders proposing 
to collect fees deemed “excessive” by the Chinese government.  Recent protests by the 
Chinese government against a plan by six foreign DVD developers to collect additional 
royalties from China’s DVD equipment manufacturers falls into this category.
14 
Innovation effect 
  Strengthening IPR protection could have a beneficial effect on innovation and 
R&D in China under some circumstances.  Stimulating spending on research and 
development in China is particularly important due to its low level and concentration in 
public institutions during the Maoist era (1949-1977).  Wu (1995) finds that China’s 
government has undertaken extensive reform of its state R&D institutions since 1978 and 
                                                 
14 See story in Zhonghua Gongshang Shibao (China Business Times), November 14, 2000. 
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has encouraged the development of R&D in the new private industrial sector.  
Nonetheless, in 1994 China expended just 0.5% of its GNP on R&D, well below the 
developing country average of 0.64% and significantly less than the developed country 
average of 2.92% (Wu, 1995).  China’s R&D as a percentage of GNP increased to .71% 
by 1998, an increase which may be partially due to stronger IPR institutions as well as 
the changing structure of the economy (China Statistical Yearbook, 1999, pp. 55, 675).   
  While a weak IPR regime may encourage imitative R&D in China, thereby building 
up its overall R&D capacity, it also discourages domestic innovation.  The Chinese market 
is quite sizable.  The tastes of consumers and technological constraints of producers 
likely differ greatly from their counterparts in other innovative nations.  By strengthening 
IPR protection, China may induce greater domestic and global innovation that favors 
local needs (see Diwan and Rodrik 1991, and Evenson and Westphal 1997).   
  Why does Chinese law inadequately protect the works of its own inventors and 
artists?  Two different cases must be distinguished. In one set of cases, enforcement of 
copyrights and patents poses a simple tradeoff: domestic inventive activity is encouraged 
but at the expense of higher consumer prices and larger transfers of copyright and patent 
royalties to foreigners.  The decision to enforce IPRs in these cases depends on the size 
and the growth potential of the local industry.  If the net result of better IPR enforcement 
is just higher prices in China and the transfer of royalties overseas, there will be little 
incentive to enforce these IPRs.  In these cases, Chinese authorities may use 
“enforcement lapses” as bargaining devices to gain a better deal from IPR owners 
concerning licensing fees and royalties.  Chinese reluctance to enforce copyrights in CDs 
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in late 1995 and early 1996 may have been an example of such behavior—or it may just 
have been retaliation for U.S. policy towards Taiwan during that period.
15   
In a second set of cases, IPR enforcement is likely to be less vigorous, as 
enforcement generates an additional cost: reduced growth of the stock of knowledge and 
human capital.  Two examples suffice.  First, enforcement of IPRs in college textbooks 
not only increases textbook prices to students and transfers of copyright royalties 
overseas, but the higher prices also reduce human capital formation by increasing the cost 
of an education.
16  Second, enforcement of some patents reduces imitative R&D in 
Chinese industry and thereby reduces the stock of knowledge accumulated via R&D 
activity.  If the switch to innovative activity in a particular industry depends on the 
accumulated stock of knowledge, then enforcement of foreign patents in China could 
delay the onset of innovative activity in that industry.  On the other hand, if better patent 
enforcement induces more foreign firms to locate plants and R&D activities in China, 
then there may be increased spillovers of knowledge to Chinese workers, engineers, and 
scientists. 
Direct foreign investment and technology transfer effect 
  The effect of IPR protection on FDI is particularly important in our context, as 
China received US$40.7 billion in FDI during 2000.  Proponents of strengthening IPRs in 
developing countries frequently cite the benefits it will bring in terms of creating a better 
environment for technology transfers and inflows of FDI.  By enhancing the 
technological base, technology transfers and FDI contribute to employment and 
                                                 
15 If such “enforcement lapses” are expected as regular moves in a game to reduce rent transfers, then their 
usefulness as punishment is impaired. 
16 Less IPR enforcement for foreign educational materials has some drawbacks.  Foreign works are less 
likely to be translated into Chinese, as widespread copying reduces compensation to Chinese translators as 
well as foreign authors.   
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economic growth.  The argument implies that foreign firms would be more likely to share 
technological information with Chinese affiliates and licensees when local competitors 
are legally restrained from infringing on the domestic firm’s intellectual property 
(Sherwood, 1991). 
  When a firm seeks to protect its reputation for quality, however, it may prefer FDI 
over either exports or transferring technology to a local vendor when intellectual property 
protection is low (Horstmann and Markusen 1987).  Indeed, in interviews with foreign 
enterprise managers in China, Maskus and Dougherty (1998) recognize a reluctance to 
license technologies or otherwise transfer technologies to local operations because of 
perceived weak IPRs.  They identify several defensive measures such as the transfer of 
only old technologies to joint venture partners, the establishment of strict vertical supply 
chains to monitor quality and to conceal underlying technologies, and sale to only large 
established firms with a premium placed on quality, i.e., public enterprises or hospitals.  
Weak IPR protection could also induce firms to decide not to export goods to China or to 
produce them in China.  For example, during the 1990s international seed producers 
restricted the export of some seed varieties to Chinese farmers due to poorly specified 
IPRs for new plant varieties in China.
17 
Maskus and Konan (1994) tested the relationship between FDI and IPRs using a 
cross-sectional sample of 44 countries and found only weak evidence of a positive 
relationship.
18  Lee and Mansfield (1996) conducted a similar study based on survey data 
from nearly 100 US firms regarding their perceptions of a country’s IPR protection and 
                                                 
17 China recently upgraded its IPRs protecting plant varieties as part of the package of measures passed to 
facilitate compliance with TRIPS Agreement. 
18 A wide range of other conditions will play a prominent role in a firm's decision to engage in technology 
transfer, FDI, or exports.  The IPR regime may be a rather minor element in a firm's decision to transfer 
technology or invest in China. 
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their investment decisions.  Their tests are consistent with the proposition that stronger 
IPR protection is correlated with a greater volume of FDI.  In particular, if 10 percent 
fewer firms reported a nation as inadequate in IPR protection (versus adequate), Lee and 
Mansfield would predict an additional inflow of $140 million in US FDI per year.
19  
Given the huge recent FDI flows to China, the impact of stronger IPRs is likely to be 
somewhat higher in China.
20 
IV.  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IPRS IN CHINA 
  Chinese policymakers face pressure to strengthen the IPR regime from multiple 
fronts.  Insufficient protection of IPRs has been a perennial source of contention in Sino-
US relations as well as a stumbling block in China's bid for WTO membership.  Yet, 
perhaps the most effective pressure originates from within.  In this section, we provide an 
overview of the forces for change and those for stagnation within China. 
A.  Domestic Forces at Work 
Chinese inventors and artists are producing important inventions in some industries, 
as well as literary, artistic, and musical works.  There has been a rapid growth in Chinese 
patent applications (Table 1).   As privatization progresses, many present and former 
state- 
 
owned enterprises are also seeking means to protect developed or acquired technological 
innovations (Oksenberg, et al 1996).  Consider, for example, dicyclol, a pharmaceutical 
inhibiting replication of hepatitis B and C viruses and reducing hepatitis manifestations.  
                                                 
19 Firms in the Lee and Mansfield study were not questioned regarding their opinions of the Chinese IPR 
system or their activities in China. 
20 Lee and Mansfield’s regression study adjusted for market size but did not include an interaction variable 
between market size and IPR protection. 
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Developed by the Pharmaceutical Institute of the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences, it 
has been patented in 13 countries and could be a significant source of income for the 
Academy—if its patent is enforced.  Piracy in pharmaceuticals is widespread in China. 
In terms of trademarks and copyrights, Maskus and Dougherty (1998) report that 
the losses in the Chinese entertainment, publishing, and consumer goods industries likely 
outweigh those of prominent Western firms like Disney and Microsoft.  A few examples 
may be helpful.  Mr. Ling Yan, chairman of the Chinese software company, Sun Tendy, 
estimates that less than 10 percent of the copies of his Chinese language software 
program, Chinese Star, are legal.  Mr. Wang Shuo, the author of numerous best-selling 
novels, has encountered thousands of infringing copies of his books in bookstalls in 
China’s major cities.  One of China’s leading rock-and-roll artists, Mr. Cui Jian, had sold 
1.2 million CDs and audio tapes through 1996, but he estimated that over 10 million 
infringing copies are in circulation.
21  Hongtashan cigarettes and Maotai liquor have been 
prominent targets of counterfeiting.
22   
Different levels of development in China’s coastal provinces and its interior 
provinces may slow down the transition to stronger IPRs (Maskus and Dougherty 1998).  
Poorer interior provincesl have less interest in strengthening IPRs than richer, more 
technologically-advanced coastal provinces, as the rent-transfer effects are likely to 
dominate innovation and technology-transfer effects in the short run in poor provinces, as 
firms in poor provinces using imitated technologies will have to license the technology 
and consumers in poor provinces will have to pay higher prices for the firms’ products.
23  
                                                 
21 See Matt Forney, “Now We Get It,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 February 1996, pp. 40-43. 
22 Maskus and Dougherty (1998). 
23 Higher licensing fees could have a variety of effects.  They could reduce profits of a fixed number of 
firms facing inelastic demands; they could put some firms out of business (as higher fixed costs can reduce 
the optimal number of firms in the market); they could put some firms out of business due to consumer 
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Even inside richer provinces, the industries capable of producing new technologies may 
often be small and poorly organized, precisely because of the country’s lack of IPR 
protection.  Both factors contribute to slowing down the transition to stronger IPRs. 
Given this scenario, foreign pressure to strengthen domestic IPR laws may 
provide an effective mechanism for overcoming the deadweight losses generated by the 
interest group logjam (La Croix 1992).   The developed country’s threat to retaliate 
against the developing country’s exporters will induce the exporters to increase their 
lobbying activities to strengthen IPRs.  In some cases the enhanced coalition pushing for 
stronger IPRs will be sufficient to override strong, organized domestic lobbies that would 
suffer losses under a stronger IPR regime.  From the perspective of a welfare-maximizing 
social planner, foreign pressure has, however, a major drawback, as developed countries 
may push for a transition path to stronger IPRs that is faster than the optimal path for the 
developing country.  We are, therefore, left with the paradox that foreign pressure with 
respect to IPRs may be privately welcomed by the domestic government yet publicly 
resisted in order to limit its overreach by foreign countries. 
  It is also immensely difficult for China to enforce IPRs effectively without a 
broader, well-established legal infrastructure.  Even in the United States, intellectual 
property is amongst the most sophisticated and rapidly changing areas of law (Oksenburg 
et al., 1996).  With private ownership a somewhat recent phenomenon, laws governing 
private property of any sort are neither deep nor broad.  Ross (1996) observed that the 
Chinese central government “simply lacks the authority” to end much of the piracy in the 
Chinese economy.  IPR regulations mandated by the central government are often 
ignored by corrupt local officials who share in the profits from piracy.  China has 
                                                                                                                                                 
response to the higher prices; or there could a combination of the last two effects. 
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established a special court system that is dedicated to resolving IPR disputes.  Jenckes 
(1997) argued that “these new courts do not provide a forum for American businesses 
seeking to uphold their copyrights.” They often lack appropriate mechanisms for 
enforcing their decisions.  Access to the IPR courts by individuals and small firms is also 
limited by the requirement that a proportion of the claimed damages be posted as a bond. 
With public enforcement efforts limited by China’s antiquated court system, 
Chinese and foreign firms are organizing into associations which would undertake 
additional private enforcement, place pressure on government to continue enforcement 
efforts, and keep the issue before the public.  Shanghai’s first anti-piracy association was 
formed in November 2000 by 43 firms with well-known trademarks.
24  The State Bureau 
of Copyrights has established a national “anti-piracy union.”  The union has 
administrative power to investigate, gather evidence, report activities, and even issue 
penalties. 
Progress on IPR enforcement may, therefore, ultimately proceed at the same slow 
pace as legal reform in China.  Strengthening IPR enforcement is particularly costly in a 
developing country, as it requires not only the application of scarce legal professionals 
but also the application of scarce scientific and engineering professionals to this activity.   
  A key source of pressure on China's government to strengthen IPRs comes from 
associations in China representing foreign businesses and joint ventures.
25  Maskus and 
Dougherty (1998) survey managers in Chinese high-technology industries, such as 
information technology and software, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, and biotechnology.  
Discussed above, they find that foreign enterprise and joint venture managers in China 
are much more likely to perceive IPR enforcement as a stumbling block than their local 
                                                 
24 Foreign and Chinese software companies have formed a similar organization. 
25 We thank a referee for pointing this out. 
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enterprise counterparts.  Direct foreign investment has been a source of economic growth 
and technology transfer.  Thus pressure placed on China's government from foreign 
business associations is encouraging change. 
B. The Political Economy of U.S. Pressure 
  American pressure on China followed a decade of pressure on other Asian 
developing countries to reform their IPRs.  From the early 1980s the United States has 
threatened countries with weak IPR laws and institutions through its “Special 301” 
provisions of U.S. trade law (Konan, et al 1995).  Special 301 allows the U.S. Trade 
Representative to investigate foreign protection of U.S. intellectual property, to negotiate 
for higher standards of protection, and to retaliate with trade sanctions if negotiations fail. 
(Table 2) 
  As Asian IPR laws approached the standards set in developed countries, the focus 
of U.S. and European pressure shifted to monitoring enforcement of IPRs, particularly 
computer software and entertainment copyrights.  Table 2 displays estimates compiled by 
the International Intellectual Property Alliance of piracy rates and lost sales by U.S. firms 
in Asia during 1995.
26  Despite increased enforcement efforts by most Asian countries, it 
is notable that piracy rates on a broad array of copyrighted products were high not only in 
China but throughout the region.
27 
  The unilateral pressures from the United States during the 1980s may have been 
due to the relatively weak set of international treaties coordinating and harmonizing 
national IPR regimes.  The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
                                                 
26 The piracy estimates clearly have severe measurement problems.  The survey respondents obviously 
have incentives to report high rates of piracy to stimulate U.S. government pressure on foreign 
governments.  The rates for business software are likely to be overstated because they do not properly 
account for customized application software. 
27 IIPA data for 1999-2000 indicates piracy rates in China have fallen from 100% to 90% for motion 
pictures, have remained constant at 99% for entertainment software, and have increased from 54% to 85% 
for music CDs.  See http://www.iipa.com/pdf/2001_Apr30_USTRLOSSESrev.pdf. 
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Property Rights (TRIPS) represents a dramatic breakthrough in the international regime, 
as it specifies strong minimum standards for the protection and enforcement of 
copyrights, patents, trade secrets, trade and service marks, and indicators of geographic 
appellation.  The result is extensive, but not complete, harmonization of national IPR 
regimes among countries that are parties to the WTO Agreement.
 28   
Future Market for U.S. Firms Selling IPR-Intensive Goods 
  Chinese economic growth averaged about 7.5 percent between 1978 and 1998, yet 
average Chinese per capita incomes remain quite low by international standards.
29  Per 
capita income in 1998 was just US$830, using exchange rate conversion, or US$3,105, 
using purchasing power parity conversion.  Since incomes using exchange rate conversions 
are most relevant for purchasing IPR-intensive imports, it is worth asking whether there is 
sufficient Chinese demand for U.S. firms to enforce against infringing uses of their 
technologies, trademarked products, or copyrighted products.   Income disparities within 
China may be the source of significant demand.  For example, in 1999, the top quintile of 
urban households had average per capita incomes that were 88 percent higher than urban 
households in the middle-income quintile (China Statistical Yearbook, 2000, pp. 315).  
Urban residents had average annual per capita incomes that were 165 percent higher than 
rural residents.  Given that there were roughly 60-70 million people in the top quintile of 
urban households in 1999, this market segment could have provided sufficient demand for 
IPR-intensive goods to warrant U.S. pressure for stronger IPRs in the 1990s.  Current 
demand must also be coupled with expected large increases in future demands.  If China’s 
GDP growth rates continue at the 6.2 percent pace exhibited between 1986 and 1998, then 
                                                 
28 See Primo-Braga (1996) for discussions of the TRIPS agreement. 
29 Recent revisions of Chinese national accounts by two economists reduced China’s GDP growth rate from 
9.2 percent to 6.2 percent between 1986 and 1998 (Maddison 1999) or, alternatively from 10 percent to 7.5 
percent between 1978 and 1998 (Young 2000). 
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average Chinese incomes will double in less than 12 years.  Efforts by the United States to 
strengthen IPR laws and institutions in China may, therefore, be best interpreted as current 
investments in China’s current and growing future demands for IPR-intensive goods.  
Changing Comparative Advantage 
U.S. government initiatives to protect IPRs in China and the rest of Asia could be 
driven by changes in U.S. comparative advantage as well as by U.S. trade deficits.  We 
examine changes in the overall trade of IPR-intensive goods by China and the United 
States and the trade in IPR-intensive goods between the two countries to determine 
whether there is any evidence for this contention.  (Table 3) 
Table 3 presents import and export data (millions of dollars) for copyright-
protected, patent-protected, and trademark-protected goods.  We adopt the classifications 
used by Keith Maskus (1990, 1993), who selected goods prominent in international 
disputes over IPRs.  Our analysis compares trade figures in 1987, the first year in which 
China reports 3-digit SITC trade figures, with trade data from 1994, a year in which IPR 
disputes between the United States and China were simmering, and from the latest year 
available, 2000.  U.S. exports of patent goods to China grew rapidly between 1987 and 
2000, but in most sectors the China trade did not grow as fast as overall U.S. exports of 
patent goods.  By contrast, U.S. imports of trademarked goods from China also grew 
rapidly between 1987 and 2000, but in most sectors the China trade grew faster than 
overall U.S. imports of trademarked goods.  U.S. exports of copyrighted goods also grew 
between 1987 and 2000 but remain very small and comprise less than 10 percent of 
Chinese imports of copyrighted goods in 2000. (Table 4) 
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Table 4 reports simple indexes of revealed comparative advantage in 
manufacturing (RCAM) of IPR-intensive goods.  RCAMs are computed as the ratio of 
sector exports to sector imports divided by the ratio of total manufacturing exports to 
total manufacturing imports.  An RCAM above unity indicates an industry with an above 
average export strength relative to overall manufacturing trade, while an RCAM below 
unity indicates a relatively strong import position for that sector.  The United States has a 
consistently strong comparative advantage in the patented sectors of medical and 
pharmaceutical products (SITC 541), surveying, measuring, drawing, and gas control 
instruments (SITC 874), other machinery for special industries (SITC 728), electro-
medical and x-ray equipment (SITC 774), and alcohols (SITC 512).  This pattern of 
comparative advantage persists when we calculate sector RCAMs for U.S. trade with 
China.
30  Despite high U.S. RCAMs for many patent goods, Chinese imports of these 
goods generally remain low, and the U.S. share of this limited trade also remains low.  
For example, the U.S. share is 13 percent in electro-medical and x-ray equipment, 7 
percent in alcohols, and 21 percent in surveying, measuring, drawing, and gas control 
instruments.  Naturally, the United States actively seeks to prevent local infringement of 
IPRs in these sectors in China.  Indeed, the low U.S. trade volume in these sectors may be 
attributable to weak Chinese IPRs if U.S. firms are concerned about the deterioration of 
their patents or if infringing Chinese production is substituting for U.S. exports.  
In contrast, U.S. imports in trademark-sensitive sectors are heavily focused on 
China, and the share of Chinese firms in U.S. imports increased in most trademark-
sensitive sectors between 1987 and 2000.  For example, starting with an 18.5 percent 
share of U.S. imports in toys and indoor games (SITC 8942) in 1987, China captured 
                                                 
30 The pharmaceutical sector is a notable exception to this pattern. 
  22   
nearly 83 percent of the U.S. import market by 2000; and China's import share of the 
U.S. travel goods and handbags sector (SITC 831) grew from 16 percent in 1987 to 50 
percent in 2000.  There was similar rapid growth in China's import share in the clothing 
(SITC 84), watches (SITC 885), and furniture sectors (SITC 821).  While China has a 
clear comparative advantage in these sectors, with astronomical RCAMs in clothing 
(SITC 84) and travel goods and handbags (SITC 831), the intellectual property 
component of these products (trademarks) tends to be foreign-owned.  Indeed, China's 
strong comparative advantage in these sectors may be partially attributable to relatively 
weak protection for foreign, especially U.S., trademarks.  The U.S. pressure on China to 
strengthen their IPRs reflects, in part, the desire to protect its intellectual property in these 
heavily traded trademark-sensitive sectors.   
The volume of trade in copyrighted goods seems very small, particularly given 
the U.S. comparative advantage in many copyrighted goods, such as literary works, 
computer software, music and films.  The low trade flows for copyright-intensive goods 
in Tables 3 and 4 may, in fact, distort the measured RCAMs as well as provide additional 
evidence that extensive piracy of these goods is occurring in China. 
Related is the American concern over its ballooning overall trade deficit, and the 
increasingly large bilateral trade deficit with China (Table 5).  The merchandise deficit 
with China reached US$20 billion in 1994 and US$84 billion in 2000, about 20 percent 
of the total U.S. trade deficit.
31 (Table 5) 
 
                                                 
31 Garbaccio (1995, pp. 6-8) notes that official U.S. figures overstate the U.S.-China bilateral trade deficit 
by about one-third.  Moreover, although U.S.-China trade deficits have increased by 900 percent between 
1987 and 1994, the combined deficit with Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China increased by only 40 percent. 
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The conventional wisdom among trade economists is that bilateral trade deficits 
are not a concern, as they reflect patterns of comparative advantage and are generally 
offset by surpluses with other trading partners.  Large U.S. deficits with energy 
producers, e.g. Saudi Arabia, are typically taken for granted.  In practice, trade deficits 
with particular countries have been the subject of special attention from the U.S. 
President and Congress.  Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, for example, the U.S. 
government pressured the Japanese government to adopt a wide variety of import-
promotion policies aimed at balancing trade.   
Cox and Ruffin (1998), have recently shown that bilateral trade deficits may 
matter in a multi-country trade war.  In a three country, non-retaliatory environment 
bashing a deficit country with a small tariff is beneficial for a large country.  The bilateral 
tariff improves the terms of trade of most favored imports (originating from the deficit 
country) at the expense of least favored imports (from the surplus country).  Of course 
with the tariff the volume of trade falls for favored imports.  Hence, an optimal bilateral 
tariff can be computed.  As in Johnson’s (1953) classic tariff retaliation model, the Nash 
equilibrium is comparable to a prisoner’s dilemma where all countries lose from a 
‘country-bashing’ trade war.  Given that U.S. imports from China are IPR intensive, 
threats against IPR infringements could be viewed as an attempt to reduce trade deficits 
with China, and thus improve American terms of trade.  IPRs may be the preferred U.S. 
policy instrument, as they are less vulnerable to retaliation than tariffs.    
Infringing Exports 
U.S. firms have typically been particularly concerned with infringing uses of their 
technologies, trademarked products, or copyrighted products when the infringing products 
are exported to neighboring economies.  Exports by Chinese firms of infringing CDs to 
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Hong Kong in late 1995 were a major trigger for the USTR’s investigation of China, as 
U.S. firms complained that Chinese IPR violations reduced sales by U.S. firms in Hong 
Kong’s lucrative market as well as in mainland China.   Why, however, are infringing 
export activities of particular concern?  Isn’t a lost sale in Hong Kong equivalent to a lost 
sale in China? 
There are at least four reasons for U.S. firms and the U.S. government to focus on 
infringing exports.  First, pirate operations with economies of scale in production become 
more viable with infringing exports, as pirates gain additional markets for their products.  
Limiting IPR pirates to the Chinese markets will hamper movement down their average 
cost curves.  Second, in foreign markets with inelastic demands, even small amounts of 
additional supply can lead to significant reductions in the price, producing a large loss for 
U.S. firms on legitimate sales.  Third, infringing exports place additional burdens on 
enforcement in the receiving country, effectively transmitting China’s enforcement 
problems to a second country.  The additional burden on police and courts could reduce the 
overall effectiveness of the importing country’s enforcement efforts.  Finally, increasing 
integration of national markets has forced many countries to standardize their IPR policies 
across markets, as markets become more difficult to isolate.  In this environment, the U.S. 
is less likely to tolerate infringing exports of its firms’ products, as this may provide a 
signal to other countries that such behavior is tolerated.
32  
China’s behavior with respect to infringing exports was particularly important to 
the United States in the mid-1990s.  Much of China’s growth after 1990 was export driven, 
and U.S. firms did not want to face additional competition in second countries from pirated 
versions of their own products.  Moreover, the U.S. government had pressured many of 
                                                 
32 The U.S. may also maintain a tough stance on flagrant TRIPS violations to set a global example. 
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China’s Asian trading partners to improve their IPR standards and enforcement during the 
1980s and 1990s.  These countries would be not pleased with dual U.S. standards on 
domestic piracy and infringing imports. 
U.S. Presidential Elections and the Electoral College 
  The increasing electoral importance of California in U.S. presidential and 
congressional elections has led U.S. politicians to focus more attention on California’s 
economy and interest groups.  California has 54 “winner-take-all” electoral votes in U.S. 
presidential elections, or 20 percent of the 270 electoral votes required to win the 
presidency.
33  Several studies have confirmed that federal policies are designed to 
maximize electoral votes, among other things.  For example, Wright (1974) and Wallis 
(1987) found that spending on New Deal programs was determined by a state’s electoral 
votes as well as its economic conditions.
34  Other studies indicate that presidential 
decisions are biased towards building winning coalitions in large, electorally important 
states.  For example, Grier, McDonald, and Tollison (1995) found that presidential veto 
decisions were influenced by the floor votes of senators from closely contested large 
states.  In general, presidential candidates have incentives to identify important swing 
interest groups in closely contested, larger states and reward them with income transfers.   
We examine these propositions by examining whether the U.S. government has 
pushed for stronger IPRs because U.S. IPR-intensive industries are more heavily 
concentrated in states with more electoral votes.  Following our earlier analysis of U.S.-
China trade patterns, we adopt the Maskus (1990, 1993) categorization of IPR-intensive 
                                                 
33 Electoral votes are the sum of the number of representatives in each state and the number of senators (2).  
States with low populations have a high number of electoral votes per voter, while states with high 
populations have a lower number of electoral votes per voter.   
34 See also Wallis (1999), Wallis (2001), and Fleck (2001) for a discussion of evidence on small-state bias 
in legislation enacted by the federal government.  
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industries and use it with the 1997 Economic Census of the United States to determine 
the number of employees and the share of employment in each state concentrated in 
copyright-intensive, trademark-intensive, and patent-intensive industries.
35  Since some 
employment data were presented as ranges of values, we calculate three different 
measures of each employment variable, using the maximum value, the minimum value, 
and the averages of the bounds of the employment range.  The correlations between the 
levels and shares of IPR-intensive employment with electoral votes, using both aggregate 
and specific measures of IPR intensity, are reported in Table 6.  There is a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between the number of a state’s electoral votes and all 
four measures of IPR-intensive employment levels.  This is, of course, to be expected, as 
large states often have more employees in most industries due to their large populations.  
To adjust for this scale effect, we estimate the correlation between employment shares in 
IPR-intensive industries and electoral votes and find that the correlation is positive but 
statistically insignificant.  We note, however, that California is an outlier, with the largest 
number of electoral votes and a high percentage of employment in IPR-intensive 
industries.  (Table 6) 
Industry influence on government policy is partly determined by its scale and 
distribution across states but is also a function of the industry’s organization for political 
action.  U.S. IPR-intensive industries became increasingly active players in the U.S. 
political arena as they became more export-oriented in the 1970s and 1980s.   In the 
1980s, numerous new industry trade associations were formed in the entertainment and 
computer industries, many with the narrow purpose of lobbying the federal government 
                                                 
35 The Census data used in our analysis are available at http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/econ97.html. 
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to obtain better enforcement of foreign copyrights on entertainment products and 
computer software.
36  
V.  ENDGAME: CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
Since the 1996 dispute over copyright enforcement, IPR disputes between China 
and the United States have cooled down.  Some of the change can be attributed to the 
additional pressure for stronger IPRs generated by high per capita income growth in 
China and accompanying creative activity by firms and individuals.  Part of the change 
can also be attributed to the conclusion of the 1994 GATT agreement and the resultant 
formation of the World Trade Organization in 1995.  The new GATT agreement held 
particular promise for China for a number of reasons.  First, it offered an opportunity to 
disable trade sanctions and annual renewals of most-favored-nation status as levers of 
U.S. policy.  Second, its gradual dismantling of the country quotas on textiles (as 
specified in the Multifibre Trade Agreement) would be particularly beneficial to China’s 
rapidly growing textile industry.  Third, it offered the prospect of secure markets for the 
growing flood of labor-intensive exports coming from a wide variety of China’s 
industrial sectors.
37  Finally, it provided the appropriate political leverage for the Chinese 
government to continue its program to reform and privatize most state enterprises.  The 
stumbling block was that only WTO members could reap these potential gains and China 
was not a member.   
To become a member, China had to negotiate bilateral agreements with 37 WTO 
members requesting negotiations.  An agreement with the United States to establish 
                                                 
36 Pamuela Samuelson noted (in a May 1998 personal conversation) that the Hollywood-based 
entertainment industry has lobbied hard for tough immediate enforcement of IPR laws in Asia, while the 
Silicon Valley-based computer industry has been more content with gradualist measures.  Trade 
associations in both industries became more active in the 1980s because exports of their IPR-protected just 
as technological changes markedly reduced the cost of pirating copyrighted products.   
37 See Abe and Lee (2001). 
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permanent normal trade relations was concluded, after many fits and starts, in November 
1999 and signed into law by President Clinton in October 2000.   An agreement with the 
European Union quickly followed.  Both agreements called for China to adhere to TRIPS 
immediately upon accession to WTO membership.  The WTO approved a multilateral 
Protocol of Accession for China on September 17, 2001 and approved its membership on 
November 10, 2001 at the Doha WTO Summit.  China formally became a member of the 
WTO on December 11, 2001.   
The siren call of the potential benefits from WTO membership fundamentally 
changed China’s approach to IPRs.  WTO membership requires that each member adhere 
to the strong minimum standards for intellectual property set forth in the 1994 TRIPS 
Agreement.
38  It became quickly apparent that for China to join the WTO, its IPR laws 
and enforcement practices would have to be strengthened substantially.   While 
strengthening IPR institutions still implied substantial costs for some sectors of the 
Chinese economy, the tie-in with WTO membership had the effect of significantly 
ratcheting up the benefits from strengthened IPRs after 1995.
39  The reduced conflict over 
IPRs after 1995 has not occurred because piracy has been curtailed in China—it remains 
a significant problem.  Instead it reflects the recognition by the U.S. government that the 
Chinese government had changed the priority assigned to strengthening its IPR 
institutions to meet TRIPS standards. 
                                                 
38 See discussion of TRIPS in Section IV above.  The WTO requires its members to adopt the TRIPS 
Agreement without reservations.  After 2005, even the least developed members must fully adopt TRIPS. 
39 This argument raises the question of the rationale behind the 1995/1996 copyright disputes between 
China and the United States.  One possible explanation is that the conflict was retaliation for U.S. policies 
on Taiwan opposed by China.  A second explanation is that many of the benefits of WTO membership, i.e., 
the phase-out of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement, were still years away.  By delaying its accession, China 
would maximize the present value of net benefits from membership.  A third explanation is that it took time 
for the Chinese government time to develop and implement new policies with respect to IPRs after the 
WTO was established in 1995.      
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The TRIPS Agreement also induced changes in U.S. IPR policy.  Prior to TRIPS, 
there were virtually no international standards governing the strength of IPRs.
40  Annual 
“Special 301” reviews of foreign IPRs and threats of sanctions to offending states were 
the main policy tool used by the U.S. government to protect intellectual property of U.S. 
citizens and corporations in foreign countries.  Since the passage of TRIPS, the United 
States has continued to utilize Special 301 reviews but has shifted the focus of 
enforcement efforts towards WTO dispute resolution panels.  As of September 2001, the 
United States had brought nine IPR cases to WTO panels and prevailed (or settled 
without litigation) in all cases.
41   
V.   A BROADER VIEW OF IPRS IN CHINA 
  Despite the rhetorical heat generated by the IPR issue, both countries have acted 
responsibly with respect to actions taken to resolve IPR differences.  Differences have 
been discussed, and productive agreements have repeatedly been reached.  The extent of 
sanctions threatened by both China and the United States has been limited, and in general 
the disputes produced only minor disruptions of U.S.-China trade and investment flows 
during the 1990s.  The rhetoric has often been heated because politicians and leaders on  
both sides do not want to appear to be giving in to the other country’s demands, 
particularly during election years and leadership transitions.  While these political factors 
have lengthened negotiations, it is important to recognize that they have not prevented the 
two sides from reaching agreements; the Chinese government from making substantive 
changes in IPR law and enforcement; and the U.S. government recognizing the limits of 
Chinese enforcement efforts. 
                                                 
40 There were international standards pertaining to other aspects of IPRs, e.g. national treatment. 
41 One IPR case filed by the United States is still in consultations at WTO, and another is being monitored. 
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  The U.S.-China disputes over IPRs must not be viewed in isolation from overall 
relations.  Friction over other issues may have induced China to slow progress on IPR 
issues to gain leverage in the other disputes.  While the 1996 IPR dispute may well have 
been an attempt to “jawbone” entertainment companies to provide better licensing terms 
for their products, it may also have been a studied response to the U.S. decision to allow 
Taiwan’s president to visit the United States.   
  More broadly, our analysis leads us to conclude that many developing countries, 
including China, would prefer to set different IPR standards for different industries at 
different stages of development.
42  Such differentiation is, however, inconsistent with the 
laws and institutions of developed countries and with the new world IPR standards set 
forth in the TRIPS Agreement.  With increasing globalization and integration of world 
markets, the United States and other developed countries have been reluctant to apply 
differential IPR standards to developing countries due to the potential for infringing 
exports and for substantial lost sales to their emerging middle classes.  The “one-size-fits-
all” standard will, however, sometimes produce too much IPR protection too early in 
some developing countries and is likely to be a source of continued international conflict 
between developed and developing countries. 
                                                 
42 Konan, La Croix, Roumasset and Heinrich (1995) discuss this issue in more detail. 
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TABLE 1 
 
CHINA'S PATENT APPLICATION AND GRANTING RATIO 
 
  Domestic Patents    Foreign Patents 
Year Applications  Granted  Ratio 
(%) 
 Applications Granted  Ratio 
(%) 
1985  9,411  111 1.2    4,961  27 0.5 
1986 13,680  2,671  19.5    4,829  353  7.3 
1987 21,663  6,401  29.5    4,414  410  9.3 
1988  28,582  11,643 40.7    5,429  627 12.0 
1989  27,367  15,480 56.6    5,538  1,649 29.8 
1990  36,585  19,304 52.8    4,884  3,284 67.2 
1991  45,395  21,178 46.7    4,645  3,438 74.0 
1992  61,788  28,311 45.8    5,347  3,164 59.2 
1993  68,153  56,882 83.5    9,123  5,245 57.5 
1994  67,807  39,777 58.7    9,928  3,520 35.5 
1995  68,880  41,248 59.9    14,165  3,816 26.9 
1996  82,193  39,721 48.3    20,542  4,059 19.8 
1997  90,048  46,379 51.5    24,160  4,613 19.1 
1998  96,233  61,378 63.8    25,756  6,511 25.3 
Source:  1985-1993 from Wu (1995), p. 239; 1993-1998 from China Patent Office. 
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TABLE 2 
 
ESTIMATES OF U.S. LOSSES DUE TO ASIAN PIRACY 




















Australia 27  4    3.8  4    na  na 
China 124  100    300.0  54    1286.0  99 
Hong Kong  10  4    5.0  13    112.2  74 
India 58  99    10.0  30    25.8  76 
Indonesia 15  98    2.0  9    82.6  80 
Japan 108  10    na  na    na  na 
Malaysia 42  85    19.0  16    48.0  71 
Philippines 26  90    3.0  22    28.0 90 
Singapore 18  2    2.4  9    44.0  42 
S. Korea  17  15    6.0  18    13.6  66 
Taiwan 29  15    5.0  13    105.4  69 
Thailand 29  65    5.0  13    73.3  80 
Vietnam 5  100    na  na    15.0  99 




  38   
 TABLE 3 (Part I) 
 
US-CHINA TRADE IN PATENT, TRADE MARK  
AND COPYRIGHT GOODS: 1987, 1994, 2000 
 




(SITC) Year  Exports  Import
s 
Exports Imports  to China from China 
Alcohols, phenols, etc.  1987  798  660  75  165  12  12 
SITC  512  1994  1,451  1,392 208 307  18  17 
  2000  1,928  1,840  260  1,604 85 30 
Medical/Pharmaceutical  1987  3,348  2,498 421 240  24  34 
Products    1994  3,805  2,531 925 217  15  147 
SITC 541  2000  5,850  4,924  1,515  255  38  397 
Polymerization Products, etc  1987  2,949  1,281  54  1,223  232  3 
SITC  583  1994  77  129  323  1,024 0 0 
  2000  178  334  7  19 1 2 
Other Machinery for Special  1987  2,994  3,761  62  2,762  128  5 
Industries   1994  6,450  5,316  306  7,002  327  34 
 SITC 728  2000  15,300  9,666  552  5,877  359  128 
Metalworking Machinery  1987  1,639  3,092  99  979  74  7 
SITC 73  1994  3,899  4,756  327  3,125  296  67 
  2000  6,167  7,970  720  2,999 204 139 
Office  Machines  1987  457  2,475  95  110 2 5 
SITC  751  1994  799  3,939 554 108  8  302 
 2000  996  3,007  1,550  360  15  885 
Automatic Data-Processing  1987  9,643  7,314  20  462  148  0 
Equipment    1994  17,726  30,615 987 832  159  735 
SITC 752  2000  24,803  57,065  10,994  4,516  759  6,540 
Electro-Medical & X-ray  1987  1,519  1,452  2  201  26  0 
Equipment 1994  2,716  1,917  24  226  57  8 
SITC  774  2000  4,406  3,253 113 683  149  50 
Electronic  Microcircuits  1987  1,623  6,083  1  74 1 0 
SITC  7764  1994  15,820  23,383  141  1,544 13 29 
  2000  38,680  42,021  2,772  13,300 506 461 
Surveying, Measuring,   1987  5,971  3,263  38  777  160  6 
Drawing & Gas Control Inst.  1994  11,205  6,036  273  1,461  255  136 
SITC 874   2000  21,106  12,883  902  2,982  468  470 
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TABLE 3 (Part II) 
 
US-CHINA TRADE IN PATENT, TRADE MARK  
AND COPYRIGHT GOODS: 1987, 1994, 2000 
 
Trade Mark Goods   US  US  China  China  US Exports US Imports 
(SITC)  Year Exports  Imports Exports Imports to China  from China 
Alcoholic  Beverages  1987  227  3,554 41 11  0  11 
SITC  112  1994 889  4,211 208 308  1  8 
  2000  1,147  7,820 123 155  2  10 
Perfumery, Cosmetics,   1987  335  546  25  5  0  1 
etc. 1994  1,715  1,250  106  25  6  0 
SITC 553  2000  2,844  2,375  266  74  15  99 
Glassware  1987  180 857 40 17  0  19 
SITC  665  1994 560  1,229 174  69  2  49 
  2000 865  2,051 498 258  10  211 
Motor Vehicle Parts &  1987  10,925  14,180  1,434  1,836  18  3 
Accessories  1994  21,591  20,708 251 740  44  105 
SITC  784  2000  30,500 29,219 1,129 2,128  124  482 
Furniture and parts thereof  1987  828  5,057  177  42  4  79 
SITC  821  1994 3,127  8,080 1,493  111  11  851 
  2000 4,744 20,604 4,582  170  53  5,264 
Travel Goods, Handbags  1987  49  2,045  253  3  0  318 
SITC 831  1994  233  3,291  2,365  50  1  1,673 
 2000  351  4,778  3,882  33  3  2,396 
Clothing  1987 1,143 22,116 5,338  17  1  2,192 
SITC 84  1994  5,464  38,643  23,731  622  8  6,666 
 2000  8,173  67,115 36,071  1,192  7  8,924 
Watches, Movements &  1987  93  1,747  483  456  0  28 
Cases  1994  276  2,713 1,914 1,090  1  349 
SITC 885   2000  348  3,599  1,831  826  2  678 
Toys, Indoor Games, etc.  1987  355  3,976  886  620  0  736 
SITC 8942  1994  66  5,255  3,064  119  0  3,627 
 2000  541  10,425  5,575  54  4  8,619 
Copyright Goods                      
Printed  Matter  1987  1,562  1,589 23 95  13  3 
SITC  892  1994 116  2,329 139 248  0  80 
  2000  4,778  3,871 487 538  46  411 
Sound  Recording  Tape, 1987 NA  NA NA NA  NA  NA 
Discs    1994 59 778 31 60  0  9 
SITC 8986 & 8987  2000  3,636  1,446  78  666  55  48 
Source: United Nations, Commodity Trade Statistics (1987, 1994), Series D.  Data for 
year 2000 was obtained directly from the United Nations. 
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TABLE 4 (Part I) 
 
US-CHINA TRADE IN PATENT, TRADE MARK  
AND COPYRIGHT GOODS: 1987, 1994, 2000 
 
Patent Goods   US-China Trade  US  China  US RCAM 
(SITC) Year  ($millions)  RCAM  RCAM  (China) 
Alcohols, phenols, etc.  1987  24  2.02  0.50  1.70 
SITC 512  1994  35  1.40  0.65  4.33 
 2000  115  1.84  0.15  19.88 
Medical/Pharmaceutical Prod  1987  58  2.24  1.93  1.20 
SITC 541  1994  162  2.02  4.07  0.42 
   2000  435  2.66  5.37  0.67 
Polymerization Products, etc.  1987  235  3.85  0.05  131.37 
SITC 583  1994  0  0.80  0.30  --
a 
 2000  3  1.05  0.33  3.51 
Other Machinery for Special  1987  133  1.33  0.02  43.49 
Industries 1994  361  1.63  0.04  39.35 
SITC 728  2000  487  2.14  0.08  19.68 
Metalworking Machinery  1987  81  0.89  0.11  17.96 
SITC 73  1994  363  1.10  0.10  18.08 
 2000  343  1.45  0.22  10.30 
Office Machines  1987  7  0.31  0.95  0.68 
SITC 751  1994  310  0.27  4.90  0.11 
 2000  900  0.36  3.89  0.12 
Automatic Data-Processing  1987  148  2.20  0.05  --
a 
Equipment/SITC 752  1994  894  0.78  1.13  0.89 
 2000  7299  1.02  2.20  0.81 
Electro-Medical & X-ray  1987  26  1.75  0.01  --
a 
Equipment/SITC 774  1994  65  1.90  0.10  29.15 
 2000  199  2.50  0.15  20.91 
Electronic Microcircuits  1987  1  0.45  0.01  --
a 
SITC 7764  1994  42  0.91  0.09  1.83 
 2000  967  1.20  0.19  7.70 
Surveying, Measuring,   1987  166  3.06  0.05  45.30 
Drawing & Gas Control Inst.  1994  391  2.50  0.18  7.67 
SITC 874   2000  938  3.28  0.27  6.99 
Note: 
a Zero U.S. imports from China in indicated sector. 
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TABLE 4 (Part II) 
 
US-CHINA TRADE IN PATENT, TRADE MARK  
AND COPYRIGHT GOODS: 1987, 1994, 2000 
 
Trade Mark Goods    US-China Trade  US  China  US RCAM 
(SITC) Year  (millions)  RCAM  RCAM  (China) 
Alocholic Beverages  1987  11  0.11  4.09  0.00 
SITC 112  1994  9  0.28  0.65  0.51 
 2000  12  0.26  0.72  1.40 
Perfumery, Cosmetics, etc.  1987  1  1.02  5.49  0.00 
SITC 553  1994  6  1.84  4.05  -- 
a 
 2000  114  2.12  3.25  1.06 
Glassware 1987  19  0.35  2.58  0.00 
SITC 665  1994  51  0.61  2.41  0.17 
 2000  221  0.74  1.74  0.33 
Motor Vehicle Parts &  1987  21  1.29  0.86  10.19 
Accessories 1994  149  1.40  0.32  1.71 
SITC 784  2000  606  1.84  0.48  1.81 
Furniture and parts thereof  1987  83  0.27  4.63  0.09 
SITC 821  1994  862  0.52  12.85  0.05 
 2000  5317  0.41  24.35  0.07 
Travel Goods, Handbags  1987  318  0.04  92.61  0.00 
SITC 831  1994  1674  0.10  45.20  0.00 
 2000  2399  0.13  106.26  0.01 
Clothing 1987  2193  0.09  344.82  0.00 
SITC 84  1994  6674  0.19  36.46  0.00 
 2000  8931  0.22  27.33  0.01 
Watches, Movements &  1987  28  0.09  1.16  0.00 
Cases   1994  350  0.14  1.68  0.01 
SITC 885  2000  680  0.17  2.00  0.02 
Toys, Indoor Games, etc.  1987  736  0.15  1.57  0.00 
SITC 8942  1994  3627  0.02  24.61  0.00 
 2000  8623  0.09  93.25  0.00 
Copyright Goods                
Printed Matter  1987  16  1.64  0.27  7.36 
SITC 892  1994  80  0.07  0.54  0.00 
 2000  457  2.18  0.82  0.79 
Sound Recording Tape,  1987  na  na  na  na 
Discs   1994  9  0.10  0.49  0.00 
SITC 8986 & 8987  2000  103  4.44  0.11  8.04 
Source:  Same as Table 3. 
Note: 
a Zero U.S. imports from China in indicated sector. 
 
b Zero Chinese imports in indicated sector. 
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TABLE 5 
 
U.S. TRADE DEFICITS WITH CHINA AND THE WORLD: 1980-1999 
 
  .     US Merchandise   Adjusted US 
   US Global  US Exports   US Imports  Trade Deficit  Trade Deficit 
Year  Trade Deficit  to China   from China  with China  With China 
         
1978 -33,927  821  324  497  --- 
1979 -27,568 1,724  592  1,132  --- 
1980 -25,500 3,754  1,058  2,696  --- 
1981 -28,023 3,603  1,865  1,737  --- 
1982 -36,485 2,912  2,284  628  --- 
1983 -67,102 2,176  2,244  -68  --- 
1984 -112,492  3,004  3,065  -61  --- 
1985 -122,173  3,852  3,862  -10  --- 
1986 -145,081  3,105  4,771  -1,666  --- 
1987 -159,557  3,488  6,294  -2,805  --- 
1988 -126,959  5,023  8,512  -3,489  --- 
1989 -115,245  5,807  11,989  -6,181  -3,400 
1990 -109,030  4,807  15,224  -10,417  -7,200 
1991 -74,068 6,238 18,855  -12,617 -8,500 
1992 -96,106 7,339 25,514  -18,176  -12,600 
1993 -132,609  8,619  31,425  -22,806 -15,500 
1994 -166,192  9,178  38,573  -29,395 -21,100 
1995 -173,560 11,748  45,555  -33,807 -24,000 
1996 -191,270 11,978  51,495  -39,520  --- 
1997 -196,665 12,805  62,552  -49,747  --- 
1998 -246,854 14,258  71,156  -56,898  --- 
1999 -345,559 13,118  81,786  -68,668  --- 
Sources:  Overall U.S. Trade Deficit from 2001 Economic Report of the President,  
Table B-103; adjusted U.S. trade deficit with China from Fung and Lau (1996), 
Table 7; U.S. trade with China from Dept. of Commerce, ntdb, 1990-99; Harry 
 Harding (1992) for U.S. trade with China, 1978-1990. 
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TABLE 6 
 
   CORRELATION BETWEEN IPR-INTENSIVE PRODUCTION AND 
ELECTORAL VOTES 
             
         LEVEL        SHARE  
              
          r  z-statistic        r  z-statistic 
Patent goods  min   0.93***  11.490            0.17   1.189 
  max   0.92***  11.009            0.01   0.069 
   avg   0.92***  11.009            0.08   0.555 
          
Trademark goods  min   0.64***  5.253            0.04   0.277 
  max   0.64***  5.253            0.03   0.208 
   avg   0.64***  5.253            0.04   0.277 
            
Copyright goods  min   0.94***  12.042            0.08   0.555 
  max   0.94***  12.042            0.03   0.208 
   avg   0.94***  12.042            0.05   0.347 
            
IPR goods  min   0.93***  11.490            0.10   0.695 
  max   0.93***  11.490            0.04   0.277 
   avg   0.93***  11.490            0.07   0.486 
Note: *** statistically significant at the 1 percent level    
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